![]() > Take a computer-nonliterate but otherwise functionally competent adult with very limited vision (macular degeneration, glaucoma, etc.), onset of cognitive disorders (Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, TIAs. And if the mail client puts up an alert that says, "Are you sure you want to attach and send a file called passwd to they'll click 'Yes' and get on with their day. The professor who didn't realize there's a "fullscreen" button when showing videos to the class is the same one who can't perceive the attachments field and will send a file called 'passwd'. Step 3: Did what I wanted to happen, happen? These users have a checklist approach to using their computer: It's like a serious chess player, who sees the whole board and thinks multiple moves ahead, compared to a novice who learnt the rules yesterday and can only see the horsey piece and the pieces immediately surrounding the horsey piece. At least or especially when they're not actively thinking about attaching a file intentionally, say. They know they're writing an email and they can see the box they're typing into, but other components, like the status bar, title bar, and attachments field, are outside their sphere of perception. And they're used to being forever in the dark about what their machine is doing and why. It is a big issue, and it's not surprising some hackers wouldn't understand how big.Ī lot of people, most even, have no idea what is happening on about 90% of their screen, about 90% of the time. I did this a few years ago after the disclosure of a file-leaking vulnerability in Firefox, because I assumed similar exploits may be discovered in the future, apparently I'm not wrong. ![]() If it's not running a separate X server, the attacker is free to take over the X server and inject keyboard and mouse inputs, but at least the files in the primary /home directory is inaccessible. At least it's a very practical stop-gap measure before someone reinvents OS security.Ī lightweight solution I used previously was running the browser in a separate Unix user with firejail's sandbox. But this hack allowed us to continue using an existing insecure desktop system, device drivers and applications, without reinventing the OS and the desktop with its set-back of non-existent support. Yes, QubesOS's approach is not pretty, it's a hack and resource-heavy. To take over the computer, the attacker must exploit the Xen hypervisor or a CPU side-channel, not just a 0day in Firefox or a PDF reader. This is the ultimate defense against arbitrary code execution in a buggy web browser. Also, QubesOS allows me to run my GnuPG daemon in a separate domain completely isolated from all other applications. There's no user data in the disposable VM, and all the data is cleared when the browser is turned off. I browse the web on QubesOS in a disposable VM.
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